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Designing a revenue sharing contract to prevent the moral hazard is one of the most important issues in virtual enterprise (VE).
As the partners’ productive effort level cannot be observed by the owner and other partners, there is usually moral hazard problem
in VE. To mitigate the moral hazard, the owner sets the monitoring effort with monitoring cost. Considering a risk-neutral owner
and multiple downside risk-averse partners, the owner’s problem of determining the monitoring effort and incentive intensity to
maximize his profit while the partners determine their productive effort to maximize their profit is addressed. The principal agent
basedmodel of this problem is proposed. By solving the model, the optimal strategy of owner and partner is derived. By comparing
with the no monitoring scenario, we find that implementing suitable monitoring strategy can reduce the moral hazard effectively.
Finally, by analyzing the partners’ risk attitude, the result reveals that the lower the risk level of the partner is, the more the owner
wants. These results suggest that VE should not only focus on the risk attitude but also on monitoring.
1. Introduction
A virtual enterprise (VE) is usually defined as a temporary
alliance of enterprises that come together to share their skills,
core competencies, and resources in order to better respond
to business opportunities and whose cooperation is sup-
ported by computer networks [1–3]. Two keyword elements
in this definition are the networking and the cooperation [4].
These explain the importance of VE to further technological
competencies. As the VE environment continues to grow
in size and complexity, the importance of managing such
complexity increases.
The advantages of virtual enterprises are the sharing of
risk, cost and skill by which the efficiency of the alliance
can be improved. Many organizations are entering VEs to
catch the new opportunities quickly and overcome the risks
associated with the opportunities. Short life cycle is an
important characteristic of VE, especially the VE in fashion
industry, which is a field of growing importance in economy
and e-commerce [5–7]. In spite of substantial advantages of
VE, there are a number of problems associated with them
that may threaten the success of VE. Das and Teng [8] have
pointed out that the main two kinds of risk in alliances are
performance risk and relational risk. Performance risk is the
probability that a VE may fail even when partners commit
themselves fully to the VE. Relational risk is concerned
with probability that member enterprises lack commitment
to the VE and that their possible opportunistic behavior
could undermine the prospects of a VE. Enterprises form
VE to reduce performance risk but induce relationship risk.
Generally, partners tend to be more interested in pursuing
their self-interest than the common interest of the alliance.
Partners are primarily motivated in enhancing their self-
interest at the cost of other partners and even the owner,
which is in fact the moral hazard that threatens the success
of VE, and such opportunistic behaviors include shirking,
appropriating the member enterprise’s resources, distort-
ing information, harboring hidden agendas, and delivering
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unsatisfactory products and services. As these activities
seriously jeopardize the viability of a VE, relational risk is an
important component of the overall risk inVEs.Moral hazard
is a kind of serious relationship risk [9].
As the partners are prone to shirk production tasks
because efforts are unobservable. We consider the owner
endowed with personally costly monitoring technology pro-
viding contractible noisy signals about providing information
about the partners’ effort undertaken to produce output.
Our modeling choices are guided by principal agent and
monitoring theory [10]. Monitoring and associated incentive
contracts are another way to combat shirking [10]. In our
paper, monitoring strategy is represented as an activity that is
personally costly to individual partners and which produces
informative signals of partners’ efforts. The benefits of mon-
itoring to the owner are twofold; it can prevent the partners
from shirking but it is costly, which is a trade-off. Traditional
contract models are based on risk neutrality, where decision
makers make decisions to maximize their expected profits.
In the last decade or so researchers have called for risk-
averse models for supply chain management to reflect the
risk preferences in decision making in order to represent
more realistic settings [11]; that is, in the field of economics,
players often have risk preference rather than risk neutral.
Based on the related literatures of profit and risk sharing in
supply chain [12–15], fashion supply chain [5–7], partnerships
[10, 16], and joint ventures [17, 18], the linear compensation
contract with downside risk constraints in a VE composed of
a risk-neutral owner and 𝑛 risk-averse partners is proposed
in this paper. Partners choose the effort level simultaneously
to maximize their expected net profits, but with a stipulation
that their downside risk is limited while the owner exerts the
monitoring efforts with corresponding monitoring cost. We
then solve the model and characterize optimal productive
efforts, incentive intensity, and monitoring efforts with risk
attitude in the compensation contract and then compare
them to the no monitoring scenario and show that selecting
the partners of lower risk-averse and implementing certain
level of monitoring is necessary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, a brief review of related literature is provided. In
Section 3, the basic revenue sharing problem with downside
risk constraints of fashion VE is proposed, which is analyzed
in Section 4. In Section 5, the contract analysis to make
further investigations of the revenue sharing contract and
the result for no monitoring contract is briefly presented for
comparison purposes. Due to the complexity of the closed-
form solutions, we present numerical examples and provide
managerial observations in Section 6. Finally the conclusions
and some areas of future research are given in Section 7.
2. Related Literature
This paper mainly studies revenue sharing contract of VE
for fashion industry with risk preference. In the following,
we provide a brief review of papers that relate to mechanism
design and risk management.
At present, risk management of VE has received consid-
erable research attentions. Various contractive decisions are
developed to provide a more scientific and effective way for
managing the risk of VE [19–21]. Unfortunately, there are
few researchers going deep into these problems of contract
design, especially the profit sharing contract considering risk
preference in VE, though VE arrests a lot of attention. We
could get some useful suggestion from the fields of supply
chains [12–15], fashion supply chain [5–7], partnerships [10,
16], and joint ventures [17, 18, 22], as they havemany common
characteristics with VE. Gan et al. [13] take up the issue of
coordination in supply chains involving risk-averse agents
and develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases
according to the supplier and retailer’s risk attitude. Then
they design a contract to achieve the set of Pareto-optimal
solutions.They further investigate a supply contract involving
a risk-neutral supplier and a downside risk-averse retailer and
design a risk-sharing contract that offers the desired down-
side protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation
profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination
[23]. Huddart and Liang [10] have studied the profit sharing
and monitoring in partnerships, they considered partner-
ships among risk-averse professionals endowed with a risky
and personally costly production technology and a personally
costly monitoring technology providing contractible noisy
signals about partners’ productive efforts. Every partner
performs the same tasks and has the same characteristics.
The authors illustrated partners’ productive and monitoring
efforts under differentmonitoringmechanisms. Bai et al. [22]
present a model of team production which incorporates the
revenue-sharing contract in joint ventures with 2 enterprises
into the property-rights and the transaction-cost theories of
the firm and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. It shows
that joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control.
From the related literature review, we found that
researchers had carried out some valuable investigations on
the profit and risk sharing in supply chain, joint ventures, and
partnerships, even VE. Most of the literature focuses on the
criteria of minimizing expected cost or maximizing expected
profit. In fact, what a manager concerns mostly is not only
profit but also the risk or loss of their alliance.Thus, designing
supply contracts is devoted to improve the expected value
of a given performance measure. In the field of economics,
agents are often assumed to be risk averse. In addition to fuzzy
evaluation [20, 21, 24, 25], case study approach [26], almost
all of the papers described risk-aversion by a concave utility
function or a mean-variance tradeoff which is widely used
in theoretical studies. This paper uses downside risk measure
to describe the risk. The mean-variance approach works best
when the random component is normally distributed. But
this is not the case in some problems such as the newsvendor
problem or others. Mean-variance analysis is an important
operational approach to deal with tradeoff between reward
and risk [7, 13, 15].Themean-variancemeasure satisfies a class
of decision makers with concave quadratic utility function,
but it is inadequate. As the variance is the expectation of
the square of the deviations of a random variable from its
mean value, it is also a mean value. The mean value is an
average based on the probability; it mainly reflects the event
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with relatively high probability while ignoring small sample
problem. In fact often the neglected rare events lead to high
risk. The variance is only an average, a reference value; we
cannot obtain the probability value to realize the value while
the downside risk has the corresponding confidence level.
The idea about downside risk is that the left-hand side of
a return distribution involves risk while the right-hand side
contains the better investment opportunities. The variance
equally penalizes desirable upside influence and undesirable
downside outcomes [27, 28]. Therefore, decision maker may
consider his downside risk criterion to be more important
than simply the variance of his profit.This paper aims to do it
by a simple downside riskmeasure to consider the risk taking
and preferences.
3. Problem Formulation
In this section, the downside risk is adopted as the risk deci-
sion criterion. Then the optimal decision making problem of
a VE in fashion industry involving constraints limiting the
partners’ downside risk is described.
3.1. Downside Risk. Now the downside risk is described
formally. A general definition of downside risk for a choice
of the decision pair (𝑇, 𝑝) is [23, 27, 28]
𝛾 = 𝑃 {𝜋 ≤ 𝑇} ≤ 𝑝, (1)
where 𝑇 denotes the target profit; then the downside risk of
the partner is defined to be the probability that his net profit
is no greater than 𝑇 and 𝛾 is the downside risk measure. The
pair (𝑇, 𝑝) reflects the degree of risk aversion for the partner.
This problem is a chance constraint problem [29]; the tar-
get level𝑇 could be associated with bankruptcy or something
less drastic. Furthermore, if the decision maker is loss averse,
then 𝑝 can be set to 0. For risk-aversion pairs (𝛼1, 𝛽1) and
(𝛼
2
, 𝛽
2
), if 𝛼1 ≤ 𝛼2 and 𝛽1 ≥ 𝛽2, then pair (𝛼2, 𝛽2) means
a higher aversion to risk than (𝛼1, 𝛽1); otherwise we cannot
compare the extent of risk aversion implied by these pairs.
The downside risk constraint is known as a chance constraint
in the operations research literature [29]. As the downside
risk measure is a special case of LPM; it is equivalent to a
VaR constraint, which requires that the worst loss given a
confidence level be less than a given bound and is often used
in the finance [23].
3.2. Problem Description. In this paper, a fashion VE involv-
ing a risk-neutral owner and a set 𝑁 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛} of 𝑛
downside risk-averse partners is considered.The owner relies
on the partners to produce the products and designs compen-
sation contracts for the partners after the output is realized.
The sequence of events is as follows. (1) At the beginning,
the owner offers a take-it-or-leave-it revenue sharing contract
in accordance with the partners’ characteristic including risk
preference and decides the corresponding monitoring effort
level.𝑀 = (𝑚
1
, 𝑚
2
, . . . , 𝑚
𝑛
) (𝑚
𝑖
≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁) to the partners
simultaneously. (2) The partner decides whether or not to
accept the contract. (3) If the partner accepts, it then exerts
a level of unobservable productive effort, 𝑎
𝑖
≥ 0 privately and
noncooperatively. (4) The output is realized and the owner
compensates each partner according to the chosen contract.
Both productive and monitoring efforts are personally costly
to the partners and owner. Denote the convex cost function
of partner 𝑖 as 𝐶
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and 𝐶󸀠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
) > 0, 𝐶󸀠󸀠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
) >
0, that is, continuously differentiable and strictly convex.
To simplify the analysis, we restrict that the convex cost
function takes the form as 𝐶
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
) = 𝑏
𝑖
𝑎
2
𝑖
/2, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. The
owner’s total monitoring cost functions to all partners as
𝐶(𝑚
1
, 𝑚
2
, . . . , 𝑚
𝑛
) = ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑙
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖
(𝐶(𝑀)), where 𝑏
𝑖
and 𝑙
𝑖
are
the margin coefficient of cost. For convenience, we will refer
to the owner as “she” and the agent as “he” hereafter.
The output of the alliance 𝜋 = ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝜋
𝑖
is realized and the
effort supervised by the owner, who receives her payoff from
the output and pays the partners based on her observations
𝑎
𝑖
, a public signal about the effort of partner 𝑖, is given by 𝑎
𝑖
=
𝑎
𝑖
+𝜂
𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, where 𝜂
𝑖
∼ 𝑁(0, 𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
)), the nosily of the owner’s
observables arising from the actual effort level of partner 𝑖,
𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
), the variance of 𝜂
𝑖
; it reflects the accuracy of the owner’s
observables [10] and is decreasing in 𝑚
𝑖
, that is, 𝑔󸀠(𝑚
𝑖
) < 0,
|𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
)| ≤ 𝑔(0) = 𝐿. As the owner’s observables will be more
stable if he pays more effort, so 𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
) is decreased in his
monitoring effort 𝑚
𝑖
. So to simplify the analysis, we assume
that𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
) is differentiable and convex and takes the following
form:
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
) =
𝐿
1 + 𝑚
𝑖
. (2)
As the actual productive effort level 𝑎
𝑖
is unobservable,
and the incentive intensity depends on the owner’s observa-
tions 𝑎
𝑖
, so moral hazard cannot be eliminated if the owner
and partners lack information about the actions of the other
partners, and the partners are subject to moral hazard, and
this behavior is unavoidable if the VE output is the only
contractible variable.
Now, the basic particular revenue sharing model will
be present. To simplify the analysis, the output function is
restricted to simple forms since this is adequate to provide
a number of valuable insights into the revenue sharing
contract. The contribution to the VE output is random with
a mean that increases in the partner’s effort and does not
depend on the effort choices of other partners, which con-
siderably simplifies the analysis; that is, the output function
of the VE is assumed to be a linear function of the partners’
productive efforts and is assumed to be𝜋
𝑖
= 𝑘
𝑖
𝑎
𝑖
+𝜀, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the
owner’s incentive intensity depends on 𝜋
𝑖
= 𝑘
𝑖
𝑎
𝑖
+ 𝜀, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
and 𝑘
𝑖
is the margin coefficient. The linear sharing rules and
normally distributed random variables are employed in this
paper, that is, adopt agency model developed by literature
[9]. which has been proved to be much more tractable in
addressingmultiaction andmultiperiodmodels.The revenue
sharing function is assumed to be linear in the output, such
as the linear sharing rules 𝑠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
, 𝜋
𝑖
) = 𝛼
𝑖
+𝛽
𝑖
𝜋
𝑖
, the base salary
𝛼
𝑖
, and the commission rate 𝛽
𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. The exogenous risk
variables of the alliance are assumed to be independently and
normally distributed, that is, 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2). Such models have
been used in accounting and economics.
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Under this linear contract, the net profit of partner 𝑖 is
given by
𝑤
𝑖
= 𝑠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
, 𝜋
𝑖
) − 𝐶
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
) = 𝛼
𝑖
+ 𝛽
𝑖
[𝑘
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
+ 𝜂
𝑖
) + 𝜀] −
𝑏
𝑖
𝑎
2
𝑖
2
,
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.
(3)
Due to his risk preference (𝑈
𝑖
, 𝑝
𝑖
), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, where 𝑈
𝑖
denotes his target profit level, 𝑝
𝑖
is the probability that his
actual profit should not fall below his target profit, from the
definition of downside risk in Section 3.1, the downside risk
constraint of partner 𝑖 is
𝑃 {𝑤
𝑖
= 𝑠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
, 𝜋
𝑖
) − 𝐶
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
) ≤ 𝑈
𝑖
} ≤ 𝑝
𝑖
. (4)
Then his objective is to maximize his own expected profit
under its downside risk constraint by choosing the optimal
𝑎
𝑖
, and this is concave in 𝑎
𝑖
, that is,
max
𝑎𝑖≥0
𝐸 (𝑤
𝑖
) (5)
subject to
𝑃 {𝑤
𝑖
≤ 𝑈
𝑖
} ≤ 𝑝
𝑖
. (6)
As the owner’s observables are costly to the monitoring
efforts 𝑚
𝑖
and take the total cost as 𝐶(𝑀), the budget bal-
ancing requires that the total output of VE should be divided
among all the members including the owner. Therefore, the
owner’s net profit function can be written as
𝑈 = 𝜋 − ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑠
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
, 𝜋
𝑖
) − 𝐶 (𝑀)
= ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
(1 − 𝛽
𝑖
) [𝑘
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
+ 𝜂
𝑖
) + 𝜀] − ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝛼
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑙
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖
.
(7)
Similar to principal-agent framework [30, 31], the partner
acts as the follower, and the owner as a leader designs
the revenue sharing contracts 𝑆 = {𝑠
1
(𝑎
1
, 𝜋
1
), 𝑠
2
(𝑎
2
, 𝜋
2
),
. . . , 𝑠
𝑛
(𝑎
𝑛
, 𝜋
𝑛
)} to maximize her expected profit while satisfy-
ing the partner’s individual downside risk constraints (DC)
and incentive compatibility constraints (IC). The owner’s
optimal incentive strategy satisfies the solution to the follow-
ing problem:
max
𝛼𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖,𝑚𝑖
𝐸𝑈 = ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
(1 − 𝛽
𝑖
) 𝑘
𝑖
𝑎
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝛼
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑙
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖 (8)
subject to
(DC) 𝑃{𝑤
𝑖
= 𝛼
𝑖
+ 𝛽
𝑖
[𝑘
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
+ 𝜂
𝑖
) + 𝜀] −
𝑏
𝑖
𝑎
2
𝑖
2
≤ 𝑈
𝑖
} ≤ 𝑝
𝑖
(9)
(IC) 𝑎
𝑖
= argmax{𝐸𝑤
𝑖
= 𝐸(𝛼
𝑖
+ 𝛽
𝑖
[𝑘
𝑖
(𝑎
𝑖
+ 𝜂
𝑖
) + 𝜀] −
𝑏
𝑖
𝑎
2
𝑖
2
)} ,
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.
(10)
Equation (9) is the DC constraint of partner 𝑖, and (10) is his
IC constraint.
4. The Optimal Strategy
To solve the model in Section 3.2, the backward inductive
method is adopted; at first, the partners’ optimal choices
of optimal productive effort are chosen simultaneously,
and then the owner’s optimal contract parameters such as
incentive intensity and monitoring effort level are worked
out. The partners’ optimal choices and then the optimal
contract parameters under the revenue sharing contract were
characterized in this section. A discussion of the results is also
provided.
The risk-averse preference parameter 𝑝
𝑖
is set as 0 < 𝑝
𝑖
≤
0.5, and this is equivalent to Φ−1(𝑝
𝑖
) ≤ 0, where Φ(⋅) is
the cumulative probability function for the standard normal
distribution𝑁(0, 1), and Φ−1(⋅) is its inverse function. Then,
the usual transformation of the downside risk constraints (9)
to traditional determined constraints is
𝑈
𝑖
+
𝑏
𝑖
𝑎
2
𝑖
2
− 𝛼
𝑖
≤ 𝛽
𝑖
(𝑘
𝑖
𝑎
𝑖
+ Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
)) . (11)
Firstly, the partners’ optimal choices of productive effort
level will be investigated. From the first-order derivatives on
the productive effort we can get (12); that is, the partner’s
incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by first-
best effort levels as
𝑎
𝑖
=
𝑘
𝑖
𝛽
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
. (12)
Note that the second-order derivatives on 𝑎
𝑖
are satisfied;
then the model can be simplified as
max
𝛼𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖,𝑚𝑖
𝐸𝑈 = ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
(1 − 𝛽
𝑖
) 𝑘
𝑖
𝑎
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝛼
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑙
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖
Subject to (11) and (12) .
(13)
The following result provides a necessary approach for the
contract to be implementable, namely, to make each partner
select the optimal effort for him.
Proposition 1. The optimal monitoring effort level 𝑚∗
𝑖
is
determined by (14)
1
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑥
=
𝐴
𝑥
2
+ 𝐵, (14)
where 𝐴 = −2𝑙
𝑖
𝐿𝑘
2
𝑖
/Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
); 𝐵 = −𝑏
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)/𝑘
2
𝑖
; 𝑚
𝑖
=
𝐿𝑘
2
𝑖
/𝑥 − 1.
Proof. At optimality, the IC and DC conditions are binding;
after substituting (12) and base salary in the original problem
we have the objective function reduced to
𝑓 = ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝛽
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
+ ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝛽
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
)
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝛽
2
𝑖
2𝑏
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑙
𝑖
𝑚
𝑖
− ∑
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑈
𝑖
,
(15)
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where 𝑓 can be proofed to be jointly concave in 𝛽
𝑖
and
𝑚
𝑖
, so the first-order derivatives are therefore necessary and
sufficient, which yields the first-best 𝛽
𝑖
and𝑚
𝑖
:
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛽
𝑖
=
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
+ Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
) −
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝛽
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
= 0
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑚
𝑖
=
𝛽
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔
󸀠
(𝑚
𝑖
)
2√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
)
− 𝑙
𝑖
= 0.
(16)
The second-order derivatives are
𝜕
2
𝑓
𝜕𝛽
2
𝑖
= −
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
< 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
𝜕
2
𝑓
𝜕𝑚
2
𝑖
=
𝛽
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) 𝑘
2
𝑖
2(𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
))
3/2
∗ [𝑔
󸀠
(𝑚
𝑖
) (𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
)) −
𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔
󸀠2
(𝑚
𝑖
)
2
] < 0,
𝜕
2
𝑓
𝜕𝛽
𝑖
𝜕𝑚
𝑖
=
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔
󸀠
(𝑚
𝑖
)
2√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
𝑖
)
> 0.
(17)
We obtain the Hessian matrix by second-order derivatives
from (17).
The first principal minor of the Hessianmatrix is negative
and the determinant is positive. That is negative definite
concavity, which is the stagnation point, is maximum and
guarantees the optimal solutions; that is, the first-order
derivatives are therefore sufficient.
Substituting the specific form of 𝑔(𝑚
𝑖
) in the first-order
derivatives and combining (16), the corresponding optimal
monitoring effort level𝑚∗
𝑖
satisfies (14).
Due to the complex structure of quintic equation (14),
the closed-form solutions for the optimal contract parameters
𝑚
∗
𝑖
cannot be derived, but the analytical results on how the
optimal contract parameters change with 𝑚∗
𝑖
can be derived
in Section 5. From the second-order derivatives and negative
Hessian matrix, the optimal decisions are unique and be
derived from (16).
5. Analysis and Discussion
In this section, to illustrate the performance of the optimal
strategies in Section 4, we will first study the optimal strategy
in case nomonitoring is used, which will be taken as a bench-
mark case.Then, themonitoring optimal contract is analyzed
and the corresponding analytical results will be studied and
compared in more detail below, where subscript (∗∗) denotes
no monitoring scenario and (∗) denotes monitoring case,
respectively.
5.1. No Monitoring Contract. In this subsection, in order to
have a better understanding of our model, the special case
with no monitoring strategy as the benchmark case, that is,
𝑚
𝑖
= 0, is used to make further investigation and compare
the results with monitoring scenario. The comparison is
illustrated as follows. When the owner pays no monitoring
effort, the error of the signal to the partners’ effort reaches its
maximum as
𝑚
𝑖
= 0, 𝑔 (0) = 𝐿, 𝜂
𝑖
∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝐿) . (18)
From the model in Section 3, the corresponding optimal
choice can be derived as
𝛽
∗∗
𝑖
= 1 +
𝑏
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝐿
𝑘
2
𝑖
,
𝑎
∗∗
𝑖
=
𝑘
𝑖
𝛽
∗∗
𝑖
𝑏
𝑖
.
(19)
The optimal expected net profit of partner 𝑖 is
𝐸𝑤
∗∗
𝑖
= 𝑈
𝑖
− Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝐿
∗(1 +
𝑏
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝐿
𝑘
2
𝑖
).
(20)
The optimal risk attitude 𝑝∗∗
𝑖
satisfies
Φ
−1
(𝑝
∗∗
𝑖
) = −
𝑘
2
𝑖
2𝑏
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝐿
. (21)
The corresponding maximum expected profit is
𝐸𝑤
∗∗
𝑖
= 𝑈
𝑖
+
𝑘
2
𝑖
4𝑏
𝑖
. (22)
5.2. Monitoring Contract. After the optimal productive effort
and monitoring effort level for each partner is determined,
the optimal contract parameters 𝛽∗
𝑖
, 𝑚∗
𝑖
, and 𝑎∗
𝑖
could be
solved from the optimization problem (13).
From (15), the first-best commission rate is
𝛽
∗
𝑖
= 1 +
𝑏
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
𝑘
2
𝑖
.
(23)
The first-order derivatives are
𝜕𝛽
∗
𝑖
𝜕𝑚
∗
𝑖
=
𝑏Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) 𝑔
󸀠
(𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
2𝑘
2
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
> 0. (24)
Equation (24) shows that the optimal incentive intensity
𝛽
∗
𝑖
is monotonic (increasing) in the owner’s optimalmonitor-
ing effort level𝑚∗
𝑖
(𝑚∗
𝑖
↑).
From (12), we can get the optimal effort 𝑎∗
𝑖
= 𝑘
𝑖
𝛽
∗
𝑖
/𝑏
𝑖
.
Further we get that
𝜕𝑎
∗
𝑖
𝜕𝑚
∗
𝑖
=
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) 𝑔
󸀠
(𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
2𝑘
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
> 0. (25)
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Equation (25) means that the higher the level of the
owner’s monitoring effort is, the more productive effort the
partner will choose (𝑚∗
𝑖
↑); otherwise, he prefers to choose
low productive effort.
We find an obvious result that the partners prefer to
choose high productive effort when they are strongly mon-
itoring (𝑚∗
𝑖
↑); that is to say, monitoring strategy can prevent
shirking problem effectively.
Obviously, the partner who shares more from the VE’s
output should bearmore risk (𝑝
𝑖
↑), as𝛽∗
𝑖
has to be increasing
in 𝑝
𝑖
. From the mean-variance risk measure, high 𝛽∗
𝑖
means
high risk, which is in accordance with the downside risk
measure [9, 32]. Considering combinations with (12), 𝑎∗
𝑖
is
also increasing in 𝑝
𝑖
which means that the less risk averse the
partner is, the more productive effort he will choose (𝑝
𝑖
↑).
The optimal expected net profit of partner 𝑖 is
𝐸𝑤
∗
𝑖
= 𝑈
𝑖
− Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
∗ (1 +
𝑏
𝑖
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
)√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
𝑖
2
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
𝑘
2
𝑖
).
(26)
When the degree of risk aversion level 𝑝∗
𝑖
satisfies
Φ
−1
(𝑝
∗
𝑖
) = −
𝑘
2
𝑖
2𝑏
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔 (𝑚
∗
𝑖
)
. (27)
𝐸𝑤
∗
𝑖
reaches the maximum as 𝐸𝑤∗
𝑖
= 𝑈
𝑖
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
/4𝑏
𝑖
.
If Φ−1(𝑝
𝑖
) ≤ −𝑘
2
𝑖
/(2𝑏
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔(𝑚
∗
𝑖
)), the optimal
expected net profit 𝐸𝑤∗
𝑖
of partner 𝑖 is increasing in 𝑝
𝑖
; if
Φ
−1
(𝑝
𝑖
) ≥ −𝑘
2
𝑖
/(2𝑏
𝑖
√𝜎
2
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
𝑔(𝑚
∗
𝑖
)), 𝐸𝑤∗
𝑖
is decreasing in
𝑝
𝑖
, which means that (27) is the optimal risk preference of
partner 𝑖 under monitoring strategy.
Comparing 𝑎∗
𝑖
with 𝑎∗∗
𝑖
, we find that the partners prefer
to choose higher productive effort when they are observed,
whichmeans that suitablemonitoring strategy can reduce the
moral hazard effectively.
Comparing Φ−1(𝑝∗∗
𝑖
) with Φ−1(𝑝∗
𝑖
) (see (21) and (27)),
we find that when the partners are monitored, the partners
bare more risk even if the optimal expected is the same as
𝑈
𝑖
+ 𝑘
2
𝑖
/4𝑏
𝑖
.
6. Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide some numerical examples based
on (24), (25), and (26). The purpose is twofold. First, the
examples are used to illustrate the model developed in
previous sections to make further investigation. Secondly,
since the optimal 𝑚∗
𝑖
and 𝛽∗
𝑖
cannot be explicitly written
as a function of related variables, it is difficult to obtain a
closed-form expression for solving the optimal strategy.Thus
we need to use the numerical examples in investigating the
charismatic of the monitoring policy.
In the following numerical examples, we assign the
related parameters as follows: 𝑙
𝑖
= 1, 𝑏
𝑖
= 1, 𝑘
𝑖
= 1, 𝐿 =
1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
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Monitoring effort m
Eff
or
t l
ev
el 
a
p = 0.2
p = 0.25
p = 0.3
Figure 1: The optimal productive effort and the monitoring effort
level.
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Figure 2: The partner’s expected profit and risk preference 𝑝
𝑖
.
0.5, 𝑈
𝑖
= 1, and 𝜎2 = 1. Figure 1 presents the partner’s
optimal effort level to three partners, 𝑎∗
𝑖
(vertical axis), as a
function of the owner’s correspondingmonitoring effort level
𝑚
∗
𝑖
(horizontal axis), under different risk aversion levels (𝑝
𝑖
=
0.2, 0.25, and 0.3). From Figure 1, we could draw out that, as
the risk aversion level 𝑝
𝑖
or the monitoring effort increases,
both the productive effort of every partner and the incentive
intensity to them increase ((12) illustrates that the productive
effort and the incentive intensity have the same trends, so we
omit the figure of incentive intensity).
Next, we conduct computational study to investigate the
impacts of partner’s risk averse level on his expected profit.
Figure 2 illustrates the results. The parameter settings are as
follows: 𝑚
𝑖
= 1 and other parameters are consistent with
Figure 1.
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Figure 2 reveals that the partner’s expected profit (vertical
axis) is first increasing in his risk aversion level 𝑝
𝑖
(horizontal
axis) and then decreasing, which verifies (20) and (26).
7. Conclusions and Future Research
This paper investigates the revenue sharing contract in a
fashionVE consisting of a risk-neutral owner and 𝑛 downside
risk-averse partners contribute core efforts to the output of
the alliance with the owner’s costly monitoring strategy; the
owner’s monitoring strategy will be more stable with high
level monitoring effort. We expect that the contract could
maximize the expected net profit of every member in VE and
reduce the moral hazard phenomena effectively by the incen-
tive contract. From the analysis of themodel, we can draw out
some valuable conclusions as follows. The less risk averse the
partner is, or the higher level of the owner’smonitoring effort,
the more productive the effort he will choose; otherwise, he
prefers to choose lowproductive effort.This observation gives
us the implication that implementingmonitoring strategy can
eliminate the moral hazard phenomena effectively.
The scope of this paper has necessarily been limited, and
its coverage could be fruitfully extended in a number of
interesting areas in future studies. For example, to simplify
the analysis and explore the implications of the contract, the
risk attitude is assumed to be known information; that is,
the adverse selection problem in VE is omitted and some
restrictions have een made in the analysis in Section 4,
such as linear/quadratic forms, independence, and normal
distribution. In the future research, we will relax these
restrictions to investigate the risk and revenue sharing con-
tract under much more general environment and consider
the incentive contract when the relationship between the
partners is cooperative; additional research needs to cite
the conditional value-at-eisk (CVaR) crition as risk measure
[33].
Future work also includes extending the primal model to
behavioral economics context, behavioral operation research
especially the fairness/equity supported strongly by experi-
ments. As fairness/equity is important for members’ relation-
ship in VE, people and firms are intrinsically fair-minded;
to qualify partners’ concerns of fairness, we will model the
interaction between a risk neutral, net profit maximizing
owner, and risk averse utility maximizing partners who are
inequity averse towards the others with fairness preferences
psychology.
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